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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the primary instruments interest groups use to influence policy is the lobbying of
legislators. Lobbying is the direct and private transfer of information to politicians in the
legislature. In this sense, lobbying is meant to include reports, arguments, messages, and
information that interest groups provide directly and privately to legislators and their staffs. It
excludes campaign contributions made to a legislators, public advertising, and grassroots
organization of employees or members. Given the importance of lobbying to policy outcomes,
groups must decide not only how much effort to exert in the lobbying process, but they must also
decide when to lobby to influence the legislature. This then poses interesting questions for
scholars: when do interest groups lobby, and what determines the intensity of that lobbying?
We can find some initial traction on this question with an examination of the
retrospective voting literature. An oft-documented fact in this literature is that voters return
legislators to office who have delivered favorable policy to constituents during their previous
term. These backward looking voters are heavy discounters, valuing recent policy-delivery by
legislators more highly than those policies passed farther in the past (Fiorina 1981, Downs 1957).
Legislators, recognizing this voter behavior, have an incentive and desire to pass legislation for
which they can credit-claim close to their impending re-election (Levitt and Snyder 1997, Stein
and Bickers 1994, Muthoo and Shepsle 2003).1 This model would then suggest that interest
groups should attempt to influence legislators when these legislators are ready to pass legislation.
1

This is sometimes called the retrospective voting theory or the WHYDFML (what-have-you-done-for-me-lately)
theory.
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That is, interest groups increase their lobbying efforts close to elections because this is the time
when politicians are trying to credit-claim for legislation that voters will attribute to the
legislators.
We can examine this hypothesis by turning to the primary archival dataset that scholars
of interest group lobbying have employed—the federal lobbying data. Since 1996, federal law
has required lobbyists and clients to report the amount of money they spend on lobbying at the
federal level (see Baumgartner and Leech 2000 for a detailed description of the data).2 In Figure
1, Panel A, we present a time series of aggregate total lobbying using this data. Because this
data is only available for a small number of years, it is not possible to conduct a reliable
statistical analysis of the results. However, a casual examination of Panel A exhibits a pattern
that is consistent with this retrospective voting model. In the 1998 and 2000 election years, there
is a jump in lobbying expenditures, preceded by a leveling out in the off-election year. This
hypothesis, therefore, seems to find some empirical, if not large-sample statistical, evidence in
the most commonly used dataset of lobbying expenditures at the federal level.

****INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE****

However, suppose we wish to expand this analysis beyond the five data points and single
time series of the federal level. Lobbying expenditures in the states would seem to be a
reasonable candidate to for more data. In Figure 1, Panel B, we illustrate total aggregate
lobbying expenditures over time in Maryland. Unlike the federal data, we do not see particularly
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The data come from the Center for Responsive Politics (www.opensecrets.org) and from Professor Frank
Baumgartner’s website (lobby.la.psu.edu). The 1996 data have been estimated from Professor’s Baumgartner’s site,
using Baumgartner and Leech (2001) as a guide.
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large increases in interest group lobbying expenditures during election years. Rather, there is a
steady increase in lobbying expenditures throughout the ten years of data.
We can contrast the timing of lobbying effort in Maryland to Maine. Figure 1, Panel C
presents the Maine data, which exhibits a very different pattern of lobbying expenditures over
time. Not only is there a “saw tooth” pattern of lobbying effort, the pattern is precisely the
opposite of the maintained hypothesis-- there are troughs during elections, but peaks in the offelection year.
This then leads us to revisit the core research question: what drives the intensity and
timing of interest group lobbying? Moreover, are particular types of interest groups causing the
peaks and troughs in the data observed in Figure 1, Panel C? To answer these questions, this
paper develops a theoretical framework based on policy windows and argues that interest groups
become active when policy windows arise. Some policy windows emerge endogenously through
the work of political entrepreneurs and interest group to create a favorable climate for policy
change. Other policy windows open exogenously, because of environmental factors and outside
events that bring issues to the attention of voters and legislators, creating a desire for policy
change. Finally, we argue that policy windows can also arise because of the structure of the
legislature and the legislative process. Many of these “structural policy windows,” such as the
budgeting process, will recur periodically, drawing interest groups to the process. We will argue
it is these structural policy windows that, on the margin, drive interest groups to lobby.
The largest challenge to examining the patterns observed in Figure 1, and the theoretical
framework proposed, is that the forum in which scholars have empirically examined lobbying—
the federal government—is a single legislative institution (n = 1) with a very short time series of
lobbying data. There is not a sufficient cross-section or time-series of data to statistically
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examine variation in lobbying expenditures as they relate to the structure of legislatures. To
remedy this problem, this paper introduces a dataset of lobbying in each of the states. The paper
offers aggregate level data on 33 states, and fine-grained data on nine of those states, covering an
average of nine years per state. These states have different legislative features, different electoral
features, and different characteristics that allow us to compare the timing and intensity of
lobbying by interest groups.
Thus the paper makes a number of empirical contributions. First, it is the first paper to
examine lobbying expenditures at the state level. Second, this is also the first paper to conduct a
comparative study of lobbying effort across states. Third, this is the first study to examine
statistically the timing of legislative lobbying.3 The panel nature of the dataset enables us to
pursue this goal. Finally, the paper refocuses our interest group lens on budgeting, the
importance of which we discuss throughout the paper.4 Building upon a well-documented
literature that has examined the micro-foundations of lobbying, this paper examines the sources
of institutional variation and features that drive the lobbying effort.
The paper demonstrates that structural policy windows, and the budgeting process in
particular, are a magnet for special interests, causing these groups to substantially increase their
lobbying effort. Contrary to the initial hypothesis, lobbying actually decreases in election years,
relative to off-election years. We find that business groups, which account for 86% of the
lobbying expenditures in the nine states for which we have detailed data, are the prime drivers
behind the increased lobbying during legislative budgeting. However, business groups have
much lower variation in lobbying effort from year to year than any other category of special
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There has been one recent statistical study examining the timing of lobbying in administrative agencies (de
Figueiredo and Kim, 2004). Stratmann (1998) and Snyder (1992) have examined the timing of PAC contributions.
4
Baumgartner and Leech (2000), in an unpublished paper, have recognized the importance of budgetary interest
group behavior in a cross-section of the federal data.

4

interests. These latter two results combined suggest that small changes in business group
lobbying can have big effects on overall lobbying expenditures. In addition, groups substantially
influenced by the state budget and groups substantially influenced by regulation both increase
lobbying during budget years. This result is consistent with the view that non-budget groups
may be encouraging legislators to attach non-budgetary riders to the budget bill that have higher
probability of passage than stand-alone legislation would. Finally, we note that laws governing
disclosure of interest group activities show no measurable effect on the total amount of lobbying
activity disclosed. Taken together, the statistics demonstrate that the structural features of
political institutions that create recurring policy windows, and budgets in particular, have a large
effect on the timing and intensity of interest group lobbying, and that businesses drive these
patterns.
In the next section, the paper outlines a theoretical framework and discusses why current
empirical papers have not yet explored the timing of interest group lobbying. Section III
describes the core data, methods, and empirical results. Sections IV examines what types of
groups are driving the variation in lobbying effort. The paper concludes in Section V.

II. THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL UNDERPINNINGS
A. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: TYPES OF POLICY WINDOWS
We begin by developing a framework for understanding the timing of interest group
lobbying. Although there are a number of theories of interest group activity, there are no formal
or informal theories (of which we are aware) on the timing of interest lobbying 5 There is,
however, a common thread in the literature that argues interest groups become active when
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Austen-Smith (1993) has developed a model of lobbying for agenda setting and then for votes, however, this is
usually considered within the same bill.
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policy windows open (Price 1978). Policy windows are those time periods when there exists a
favorable climate for changes to legislation. Legislators focus more of their attention on the
issue at hand, and are disposed to consider whether and how the policy should be changed
(Baumgartner and Jones 1993, Grossman and Helpman 1999, 2001).
In the literature, policy windows arise through two main processes. First, policy
windows arise through the political entrepreneurship of legislators and the “offensive” activity of
interest groups in creating these policy windows (Wilson 1980, Lowi 1964). Individual
legislators are constantly seeking issues with which they can be identified to enhance their reelectability. Interest groups support legislators in these pursuits, creating and disseminating
information to create a climate for an opening of the window (Hall and Wayman 1990, Fenno
1973). Through this mechanism, policy windows are created endogenously, through the
planning of interest groups and legislators (Kollman 1997). Tax policy, telecommunications
bills, and banking deregulation all usually have these types of characteristics. We call these
policy windows endogenous policy windows.
A second method by which policy windows arise is through exogenous and or
environmental events which refocus legislator attention on a given policy area (Price 1978). For
example, the September 11 attacks upon the World Trade Centers created a policy window for
the airlines and homeland security, the Enron and MCI accounting scandals created a policy
window for “good governance” interest groups, and the eastern seaboard electrical grid failure
created a policy window for both the energy industry and environmentalists. In this approach to
policy windows, special interests are largely viewed as opportunists, targeting their lobbying
efforts when these exogenous events happen (Arnold 1990, Walker 1991). We call these policy
windows exogenous policy windows.
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However, a third mechanism by which recurring policy windows arise is through
structural, legislated, or procedural mechanisms. That is, features of political institutions
determine the creation of policy windows, and thus the timing of interest group activities. These
policy windows may be micro-structural policy windows, usually created legislatively, that
pertain to a given piece of legislation or issue area. For example, in the 1990s, the granting of
most-favored-nation (MFN) trade status to China required annual renewal, creating a recurring
policy window for legislators to act. Likewise, before the advent of automatic cost-of-livingadjustments to Social Security, Congress visited the benefit levels annually choosing how large
of a benefit increase to authorize Social Security recipients—creating another particularized
structural policy windows. Alternatively, these recurring policy windows may be macrostructural windows, usually determined constitutionally or procedurally, that affect a large
number of issues before the legislature. One structural feature of government that create these
policy windows is the convening of the legislature. It is not surprising that when the legislature is
in session a rise in interest group activity occurs. However, another institutional feature that has
received attention in the literature on congressional budgeting, but has been largely overlooked
in the interest group literature, is the timing and process of budgeting in legislatures.6 Special
interests can extract favors from the government in the budgeting process through the actual
budget itself or the attachment of regulatory and other riders to the budget bill. This suggests
that the budgeting process should be particularly susceptible to special interest lobbying
(Wildavsky 1979, Wander et al 1984) in a periodic and recurring manner. It is during these
times that interest groups will become active. We call these recurring policy windows structural
policy windows.

6

There is an extensive literature on budgeting and the determinants of fiscal responsibility in the states. See Alt and
Lowry (1993) and Lowry et al (1998) for an example.
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B. THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE AND DATA LIMITATIONS
The empirical studies of interest groups have been centered on an examination of interest
group activity at the federal level. Papers that have examined congressional lobbying have
focused, generally, on three types of analyses. First, papers have statistically and descriptively
examined individual issues to describe how competing interest groups position themselves to
lobby over a given issue (Rothenberg 1992, Derthick and Quirk 1985; for an excellent summary,
see Smith 1995, Baumgartner and Leech 1998). These studies, however, have a number of
limitations because they are generally on single issues and one cannot compare lobbying
behavior across issues.
This has led to a second set of papers covering lobbying expenditures at the federal level
(Baumgartner and Leech 2001, Ansolabehere et al 2003, de Figueiredo and Silverman 2002).
The Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 provided data to scholars on annual lobbying expenditures
at the federal level. While these papers yield results on the make-up of lobbying expenditures,
the degree of access accorded to interest groups, and the effectiveness of lobbying effort, the
analysis is almost always cross-sectional, based on one year of data. Moreover, because the data
is only at the federal level where budgeting, for example, occurs annually, it is difficult to
identify any structural, comparative, or timing issues that can be analyzed.
A final important literature this paper speaks to is the literature on lobbying at the state
level. Lowery and Gray (2000) have extensively examined the number of lobbyist registrations
across the states. Taking registrations at periodic intervals (usually 5-years apart), the authors
have developed a theory of interest representation based upon the population ecology variables
of competition and legitimation. This data has been used to explore a number of factors affecting
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the prevalence of interest groups in states. Complementing their work is a host of case studies
that have examined similar issues (Hrebenar and Thomas 1992, 1993). While these papers have
extended our comparative work in the area of interest groups, they have generally limited their
analysis to the number of lobbying groups, and from that, sometimes make inference about the
intensity interest group activity. Whether this latter step is valid is an open question. This paper
addresses these three shortcomings.

III. CORE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
A. DATA
The panel dataset employed in this section comprises state-year aggregate lobbying
expenditures across all states where available. The total aggregate lobbying expenditure by state
by year was obtained from each state (either the Ethics Commission or the relevant office).
Thirty-three states provided us with the data. The remaining states either did not collect the data
or collected but did not keep the data. The range of time periods is 3 years to 25 years of data for
each state. All data are converted to 2000 real dollars, deflated by the consumer price index
(CPI-U). To create our dependent variable for the statistical analyses, we take the log of the
state’s per capita lobbying expenditure in a given year.7 A full description of all the data and the
data sources is provided in the Appendix.
There are three sets of independent variables. The first set measures the electoral factors
that might affect interest group activity. This includes variables on whether there is an election
in the current time period for legislative seats, whether there is unified government, whether
there is Democratic unified government (Wiggins et al 1992), and the size of the majorities in the
House and Senate of each state.
7

This further reduces the effect of outliers and other potential anomalies in the data.
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A second set of variables includes characteristics of the institutional design and
legislative process of each state. These variables measure whether the legislature is required to
meet in regular session, whether the legislature is required to meet in special session, and
whether the state is required to engage in creating a new budget in a particular year. These are
the variables that underlie the structural policy windows we are interested in. We code these as
dummy variables with a one if the state is in a regular session in a special session, or in a budget
year, and zero otherwise, for the three separate variables.
A third set of independent variables provides controls for the state characteristics that
move over time. This includes data on the state’s per capita income. We also include variables
for the year and the year-squared.

B. DESCRIPTIVE DATA
To capture the variation in the timing of lobbying effort, we analyze three representative
states: New York, Wisconsin, and Oregon. These have been chosen because they represent
three different institutional structures of the legislative process. New York has annual regular
sessions and annual budgeting; Wisconsin has annual regular sessions and biennial budgeting
and Oregon has biennial regular sessions and biennial budgeting. We provide the data in Figure
2. What is striking about these three graphs is their responsiveness to the budgeting process.
While New York sees a steady increase in real lobbying expenditures, Oregon’s and Wisconsin’s
lobbying expenditures increase substantially in budget years, and drop in off-budget years. In
addition, comparing Oregon to Wisconsin, we seem to see a regular session effect as well. This
descriptive data provides initial support to the fact that institutional design may affect interest
group effort, and in particular, budgeting may be the focal point for interest groups. However, to
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more thoroughly examine the structural windows hypothesis in the paper, we turn to a
multivariate statistical analysis.

****INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE****

C. METHOD
In order to examine the empirical validity of the theoretical framework, we conduct an
OLS regression on panel data. One concern that naturally arises in this kind of panel study is
that states differ widely in their lobbying disclosure rules. What is considered lobbying in one
state is not necessarily considered lobbying in another state, and thus need not be reported. To
control for this, we use state fixed-effects in our statistical analyses. The fixed effects estimation
method controls for differences across states, and allows us to measure within state variation
over time with panel data methods (Hsiao 2002). With state fixed effects, we include a dummy
variable for each state. later specifications, we explore random-effects models as well

D. RESULTS
Table 1 provides initial results. The dependent variable is the log of annual, per capita
interest group lobbying expenditures. Model 1 includes the control variables (Ln(Per Capita
Income), Year, and Year2) with the electoral variables (Election Year, Size of House Majority,
Size of Senate Majority, Unified Government, and Democratic Unified). Model 2 includes the
control variables with the legislative structure variables (Budget Year, Regular Session, and
Special Session). Model 3 includes all three sets of variables. Model 4 includes interaction
effects. All models include state fixed effects for the 33 states considered. A positive coefficient
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on a variable means an increase in the variable increases the amount of lobbying within a state
relative to mean level of lobbying for that state; a negative coefficient means an increase in the
variable of interest decreases the amount of lobbying. Standard errors of the coefficients are
listed in parenthesis below the coefficient estimates. Statistical significance at the 99%, 95%,
and 90% level are noted.

****INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE****

We begin by discussing the income variable. Per capita income has a large effect on
expected lobbying expenditures in all the models. A 1% increase in a given state’s per capita
income results in an approximately 7.3% increase in lobbying. This result is similar in sign, but
greater in magnitude, to a result found for PAC contributions in earlier work (Ansolabehere et al
2003), where per capita income has substantial power in explaining the levels of campaign
contributions in gubernatorial campaigns.
We turn now to electoral variables. In Model 1, the coefficients on Election Year and the
Size of Senate Majority are statistically significant and negative. In this model, an Election Year
causes lobbying to decrease by 18%, while each percentage increase in the size of the majority
by the majority party in the state senate causes lobbying to decrease by 1.3%. Though the
former result is not robust once we include legislative structure variables in Model 3, we will see
in Model 4 that this result reappears as statistically significant. The latter result persists in its
statistical significance across all models. No other electoral variables are statistically significant
in this model.
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We then add the institutional structure variables in Models 2 and 3; here we obtain some
interesting effects. We discuss the results of Model 3, as it is similar to Model 2. First, when a
legislature is in regular session, lobbying skyrockets about 190% over what it would be
otherwise. While this is expected, it is interesting to note that this effect holds even when we
control for special sessions. In fact, special sessions do not result in more lobbying. In addition,
we see a 20% increase in lobbying if during those sessions, the budget is under consideration.
That is, lobbying interests increase their efforts substantially during budget years in response to
the budgeting process. This is one of the main findings of this paper. Both of these effects,
which are statistically significant, cannot be observed in the federal lobbying data because
Congress meets and budgets on an annual basis. The budgeting process, a recurring structural
policy window, attracts interest groups and results in substantially higher lobbying effort by
these groups.
Model 4 includes an interaction term of regular session with election year. Inclusion of
this term leaves most coefficient estimates close to their former magnitudes and statistical
significance. The interaction term, however, is positive and statistically significant. The results
show that while lobbying increases 77% during regular sessions, it increases an additional 145%
(total of 222%) during election years if there is a regular session. The coefficient on Election
Year is also now negative and statistically significant. It means that lobbying declines
substantially (40%) during election years, unless there is a regular session held. If this latter
condition holds, however, the total marginal effect of Election Year (the sum of the marginal
effects of Election Year and Regular Session*Election Year, holding Regular Session at 1) is
almost zero, allowing us to interpret the negative direct effect of elections on lobbying as almost
exactly canceling out the positive effect of having a legislature in session during elections.
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Taken together, these results suggest that the timing of sessions and budgeting bring out
interest group activity in the legislature. While most electoral factors seem to have little effect
on the timing of lobbying, there are two exceptions. First, the size of the senate majority has a
persistent and statistically significant negative effect on lobbying. In addition, elections tend to
decrease lobbying (relative to off-election years) unless the legislature is in session, in which
case, the total electoral effect is substantively close to zero.

E. ROBUSTNESS AND EXTENSIONS
In order to check the robustness of the results presented in Table 1, we conduct a number
of tests whose results we present in Table 2. First, we explore the possibility that the size of the
budget is what drives aggregate lobbying expenditures. To this end, we construct a variable that
represents the amount of the budget under consideration in each year.8 We present the results in
Model 5 of Table 2 with caution, only as a robustness check, because the size of the budget may
be endogenous to lobbying effort. With that caveat, we note that a 1% increase in the budget
results in an 8% increase in lobbying expenditures. This is consistent with results in the earlier
models. The effect of Regular Session is slightly less than in previous models. The only
electoral variables which have statistically significant coefficients are the Size of Majority
variables. The Election Year variable and the interactive variable are not statistically significant,
but their magnitudes are almost the same as before.

8

We take the amount of the budget in any given year. For those with biennial budgets, a problem arises. In the offyears, the budget is zero. We could model this, but then if we take logs, these observations disappear. Moreover the
results, if we just use budget levels, are similar to the dummy variable specification. To address this concern, we
use 90% of the two-year budget in the budgeted year, and 10% of the budget in the second year. The rationale is
that in any given off-year, up to 10% of the budget can be re-budgeted during special session to accommodate fiscal
needs. Thus, the amount of budget up for grabs is about 10% of the entire budget. We then adjust the budget for per
capita spending then take logs.
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****INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE****

Second, there may be other institutional features that affect lobbying that have been
missed in the main analysis. We have catalogued six types of institutional structures that might
affect the intensity and timing of lobbying: the presence of budget caps (Primo 2003), legislative
term limits (Primo and Milyo 2004), the degree of professionalization of the legislature (Fiorina
1994; Maestas 2000), the number of seats in the state house and senate chambers, the size of the
veto-proof majority (Holburn and Vanden Bergh 2004), and the ease with which the legislature
can overturn administrative agencies (Weingast and Moran 1983). We measure these variables
as noted in the Appendix. One problem with including them in the statistical analysis, however,
is that these do not change within state over time. Therefore one cannot used state fixed effects
in a regression if one hopes to include these variables. However, one can use a random effects
model.
To test the robustness of the random effects model, Model 6 replicates Model 4 using
random effects. The coefficient estimates and the statistical significance of those coefficients are
very close across the models. A Hausman specification test indicates that we cannot reject the
hypothesis that the coefficients of the fixed effects and random effects models are the same at the
95% level of confidence. Having established the comparability of the random effects and fixed
effects model, we then include in Model 7 the variables measuring the additional institutional
features using random effects. None of the additional institutional structure variables have
statistically significant coefficients, suggesting we can reject the hypothesis that they influence
total lobbying expenditures at the 95% level of confidence.
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A fourth issue is whether lobbying disclosure regulations are driving the result. Some
authors have suggested that tighter lobbying disclosure regulations result in less lobbying
because disclosure can tarnish the reputation of the lobbyists and the lobbying profession
(Brinig et al 1994). Other authors have argued that lobbying regulations have little effect on
lobbying firms (Lowery and Gray 1997). These papers cite as evidence for these points of view
the number of lobbyists registered. In conducting this robustness check, we also hope to settle
this argument by employing, as the dependent variable, actual lobbying expenditures.
There are two general types of lobbying disclosure rules. The first are the types that
expand the definition of lobbying. These include new rules that include small gifts to legislators
as lobbying expenditures, rules that include certain types of events as lobbying expenditures, and
rules that expand the definition of lobbying activities (such as to include any meetings with
legislators rather than just those to discuss a specific bill). These types of changes in lobbying
rules should result in an increase in lobbying expenditures disclosed. A second type of
disclosure rule is one that does not expand the definition of lobbying, but requires groups to
disclose their lobbying expenditures in a more detailed and refined way. For example, rules that
require interest groups to categorize their lobbying expenditures and rules that require lobbying
groups disclose their source of funding should not increase disclosed lobbying expenditures per
se, but should offer the public more disclosure on the current expenditures.
In Model 8, we replicate the base Model 4 using these variables. Neither type of
disclosure law has an effect on the reported amount of lobbying activity by interest groups.
This result is consistent with Lowery and Gray (1997) who show that tougher lobbyist
registration rules in the state have no effect on the number of lobbying registration, but
inconsistent with (Brinig et al 1994). We can make a similar statement about the effect of
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disclosure laws on the reported amount of lobbying. On the whole, these sets of laws lead to no
change in the disclosed aggregate lobbying expenditures. This, however, does not mean that
there is no change in lobbyist behavior (as has been argued in earlier work), only that whatever
changes there are do not show up in disclosed aggregate lobbying expenditures.
Overall, this section supports the previous results that structural policy windows, as
determined by the frequency of sessions and the budgeting process, are the primary drivers of
changes in total aggregate lobbying expenditures. Moreover, other factors, such as budget caps,
term limits, professionalization of legislatures, and lobbying disclosure rules have little impact
on disclosed lobbying expenditures.

IV. UNDERSTANDING THE GROUPS THAT CREATE THIS PATTERN
Having established the empirical fact that budgets draw interest groups to lobby
legislatures, we now want to understand which groups create this pattern in the data. To do this,
we rely on very fine-grained data for nine states who agreed to provide us with data. These nine
states’ Ethics Commission keep time-series data on each individual interest group’s lobby
expenditure each year (for four to ten years). There are over 35,000 interest group-state-year
observations of expenditures, covering more than 5,000 separate state-level interest groups.

A. SIMILARITIES TO POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEES
In order to benchmark the aggregate lobbying data, we begin by comparing the lobbying
efforts of interest groups to campaign finance contributions of interest groups. We use the
classification system used by scholars of political action committee (PAC) contributions (e.g.
Ansolabehere et al 2002) and the Federal Election Commission (2001) that categorizes each of
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the interest groups into one of four areas: businesses, trade associations, membership/ideological
groups, and unions. We have added a “government” category as well because lobbying by state
agencies or city governments is required to be reported in many states. This categorization of
lobbying expenditures allows us to compare our results to the PAC literature.
First we describe the lobbying data. Reported per capita lobbying expenditures differ
vastly by state from $.01 to $18.32, with a mean of $2.44. A variety of reasons exist for this
variation, not the least of which is the laws regarding disclosure. Within states, however, there
can still be substantial variation in lobbying across different categories of interest groups and
across years. Table 3 uses our preliminary categorization of groups to identify the expenditures
for each group for all years’ data available for the nine states for which we have this data. While
one must be careful when comparing amounts across states (because of different disclosure
rules), comparisons within state do provide a snapshot of lobbying effort. Here we see that in
every state, firms and trade associations account for no less than 80% (86% average) of lobbying
expenditure. Unions spend less than 4.2% of total lobbying expenditures in each state.
Membership groups account for 3%-15% of total lobbying expenditures.9

****INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE****

In Table 4, we contrast the distribution of lobbying expenditures with PAC contributions.
The data sources are listed in the table.10 At the federal level, business (corporations and trade
9

Whether this means that business interests exert more influence in lobbying than do labor and issue groups is
unclear. Only future study will allow us to understand this question. Moreover, this preliminary finding helps to
explain the findings of earlier studies that document business interests having far more lobbyist registrations than
labor and membership groups. This higher number of registrations is manifested in more lobbying expenditures.
10
The data on state PAC/Special Interest money is approximate. The Institute of Money in State Politics (IMSP)
hires contractors to collect data from the states on all state campaign finance contributions. We have checked their
data against state records (collected by the state election commissions) against Jensen and Beyle (2003) and find that
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associations) comprise 67% of PAC giving, while they comprise 84% of lobbying expenditures.
At the state level, these business groups comprise 62% of special interest contributions, but 86%
of lobbying expenditures. Labor groups comprise 9% of federal PAC contributions, and 6% of
federal lobbying, while at the state level, labor groups comprise 16% of special interest
contributions to campaigns and only 2% of lobbying expenditures. Finally, although
membership and ideological groups make up a roughly equivalent percentage of campaign
finance contributions at the federal and state level (22%-23%), they represent 7% of lobbying
expenditures at the state level and only 2% at the federal level. Overall, these results suggest that
lobbying is largely a business phenomenon at both the state and federal level, but the business
community focuses more on lobbying and less on campaign finance at the state level than the
federal level.

****INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE****

B. GROUP TYPE AND LOBBYING TIMING
Taking the categorization given above, we examine whether different types of groups
time their lobbying in systematically discernible ways. To analyze this question, we sum each
category of groups’ expenditures, so that we know how much unions are spending in each state
by year; how much membership groups are spending in each state by year, etc. From this, we
create a set of new dependent variables for the next set of regressions to try to identify the
underlying patterns of lobbying. We aggregate the lobbying expenditures by interest group
they are somewhat close—approximately within 5-10% of each other. We then used the classification system from
the IMSP to classify the state PAC data. Ideological and Party Groups were classified as Ideological/Membership.
Unions and Civil Service/Retirement groups were classified as Unions. All others were classified as corporations
and trade associations collectively. The data in Tables 4 provide the detailed data on the state level for the nine
states listed in Table 3.
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category by state on a per capita basis and take logs. We now take this as our dependent variable
and re-run Model 4 to see if certain groups are driving the aggregate pattern of lobbying
observed. In this section, each observation is a state, year, interest-group-type aggregate
lobbying expenditure. Again, we use OLS with state fixed effects in the regressions.
Because only nine states are reported here, there are only 53 observations. With 13
explanatory variables and nine fixed effects, there are not many degrees of freedom, meaning
that the standard errors are likely to be large. With this caveat, we present our results in Table 5

****INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE****

Model 9 includes lobbying by firms, Model 10 includes lobbying by trade associations,
Model 11 uses lobbying by unions, Model 12 uses lobbying by government agencies, and Model
13 uses lobbying by membership groups. In all the models the coefficients on Budget Year and
Regular Session are positive. In Models 9 and 10 (collectively business), per capita lobbying
expenditures are 40% higher for firms and 28% higher for trade associations in budget years than
non-budget years. These results are statistically significant at the 95% level of confidence. In
Models 11, 12, and 13, we see that per capita lobbying expenditures are 38% higher, 50% higher,
and 84% higher for unions, governments, and membership groups, respectively, in budget years
relative to non-budget years. These coefficients, however, do not reach the standard levels of
statistical significance, perhaps because of the few degrees of freedom. Although a handful of
other coefficients are statistically significant, there is no systematic pattern. However, it is
worthwhile noting that unions are the only type of interest group that has a positive coefficient
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on Election Year and negative coefficient on the interaction term. In addition, government
interest groups increase their lobbying substantially during periods of unified government.
Taken together, these results lead us to a number of interpretations of the data. First, all
groups lobby at substantially higher levels when the legislature is in regular session, but none of
the coefficients are statistically significant at the 95% level. Second, the increase in lobbying
expenditures during budget years seems to be driven by business, and not by unions or
government agencies. Third, given the relative magnitude of the budget coefficients of the five
models, businesses exhibit lower variation in lobbying expenditures from year to year than other
organizations. This fact, combined with the fact that business accounts for over 80% of lobbying
expenditures (noted in the previous section), suggests that businesses maintain a continued
presence in state capitals, lobbying on a regular basis, while other groups maintain a more
sporadic lobbying effort. Moreover, when budgets arise, businesses raise their lobbying
expenditures somewhat. However, because businesses represent such a large percentage of total
lobbying expenditures, the 30-35% increase in lobbying expenditures they engage in during
budget years means they create a large increase in aggregate state lobbying expenditures.
Fundamentally, the spikes seen in the biennial budgeting states shown in Figures 1 and 2 are
generated by business interest groups.

C. ISSUE AREAS AND LOBBYING TIMING
Although businesses are driving the spikes and troughs in lobbying, in a final empirical
extension, we examine the extent to which groups affected by different policies of government
time their lobbying differentially. We do this by examining the timing of lobbying by issue area.
We classify each interest group in these nine states as primarily concerned with one of thirty-two
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issue areas. We then create two main “types” of interest group categories: groups which are
affected by both budgetary and regulatory rules of the state, and those groups which are affected
primarily by regulatory rules.
To implement this, we use a classification system developed by Wolak et al (2004).
Wolak et al obtained the names of every interest group that lobbied at the state level in 1997
(over 34,000 in total). They then categorized each group by topic area they identified. We have
taken the Wolak et al coding and merged it into our file, adding eight additional categories to
obtain more fine-grained detail. However we have panel data, and new interest groups enter
every year into each state. We conducted web searches until every interest group was identified
using this classification system. Table 6 presents the classification.

****INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE****

In addition to the two broad categories we identified above, we also examine issue areas
where the lobbying efforts by interest groups which most legislators might like to “hide” from
their constituents. These issue areas, such as tobacco firm lobbying, pharmaceutical lobbying,
real estate developer lobbying, alcohol lobbying, and gambling industry lobbying, may be
particularly problematic for legislators, and we examine this is more detail.
We recognize this classification is somewhat stylized and rough. In reality, there is a
continuum between how much an interest group is affected by budgets and how much an interest
group is affected by regulation. We do believe to a first approximation, however, that these
budget categories reflect where the preponderance of state’s influence is on the special interest’s
business (e.g. education is both budgetary and regulatory, while insurance is primarily
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regulatory). That said, we have experimented with a number of reasonable reclassifications and
find the results discussed below are robust to these reclassifications.
As before, we sum each topic area’s expenditures, so that we know how much agriculture
is spending in each state by year; how much health groups are spending in each state by year, etc.
for the nine states. We aggregate the lobbying expenditures by issue by state by year on a per
capita basis and take logs to create the final dependent variables, and run models similar to the
previous section, using OLS with both state and issue area fixed effects.
Given that budgetary issues can only be handled within the budget framework, one would
expect that these issues would result in more lobbying within the legislature during budget years
than non-budget years. Regulatory issues, on the other hand, do not result in the direct transfer
of money from the government to the interest groups in contracts or spending, but are molded by
government policies and regulatory power to create the competitive environment. Because these
regulations can be passed at any time, there are two factors that affect the timing of regulatory
lobbying expenditures. On one hand, it is less costly to pass policy proposals that are attached as
riders to the budget, rather than stand-alone bills, because the budget must pass annually, and the
process of amending the budget in committee (or on the floor) is generally less onerous than
passing a regulation as a stand-alone feature (Oleszek 1996, Krutz 2001). Thus, from a cost
perspective, interest groups are more likely to have success passing regulatory rules during
budgeting, and therefore we should see an increase in regulatory lobbying during budget years.
On the other hand, in a retrospective voting model with heavy discounting, legislators may get
more credit for passing legislation close to the election rather than in previous time periods. If
this is the case, then legislators benefit more passing legislation close to the election rather than
earlier. In a biennial budgeting state, higher benefit would be conveyed in the off-budget year
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(or the election year). This would lead to higher incentive to pass bills in the off-budget year.
Which effect dominates is an empirical matter. If we see regulatory groups lobbying more
heavily in budget years, we assume that the “rider” effect dominates. However, if we see
regulatory groups lobbying more heavily in election years, then the “retrospective voting” effect
dominates.
Table 7 presents the results. Model 14 presents the results for budgetary and regulatory
issues, Model 15 presents the results for primarily regulatory issues, and Model 16 presents the
results for “hidden groups.” 11 In Model 14, the coefficient on Budget Year is positive and
statistically significant. There is, not surprisingly, a 39% increase in lobbying by groups
concerned with budgetary issues during budget years. There is a 50% decrease in lobbying by
these same groups during election years, though a session during an election year leads to
slightly more lobbying on net (through the interactive effect). Unified government of either
party leads to 46% more lobbying than during spells of divided government.

****INSERT FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE****

Many of the results in Model 15 are similar. Groups that are concerned primarily about
regulatory issues lobby even more in budget years, on the margin, than those concerned about
budgets. There is 49% increase in lobbying for these groups during budget years, an increase
which is statistically significant at the 99% level. Special sessions also result in more regulatory
lobbying. The Election Year coefficients are not statistically significant. Republican unified
government results in 30% additional lobbying than non-unified government, while Democratic
11

One concern that may arise is that budget years sometimes have longer sessions than non-budget years. To
control for this, we replaced the session year variable with short session and long session variables and re-run the
regressions. The results are nearly identical.
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unified government results in 9% less lobbying than non-unified government. This latter result
actually points to groups affected by regulation may be lobbying heavily for deregulation rather
than regulation. In sum, despite having fewer budgetary concerns, groups primarily affected by
regulations do more lobbying during budgetary years and during Republican unified government.
Finally, Model 16 includes regressions for “hidden groups,” those groups that legislators
likely wish to hide from the voters. These groups show no discernible pattern of lobbying, as no
variable has a coefficient that is statistically significant. These groups seem to spread their
lobbying effort evenly across time, political and electoral factors, and institutional structures,
which may be a sensible strategy if groups wish to remain hidden.
Overall, these final results paint an interesting picture of the composition of the lobbying
effort by interest groups. While groups affected by the budget do increase their lobbying
expenditures during budget years, groups not affected by the budget also increase their lobbying
expenditures during budget years. One reason for this may be that these latter groups are
attempting to create or prevent riders from being attached to the budget that will affect the
regulations that govern them. Indeed, given the budget bill must pass on an annual basis,
attaching riders to the budget is a less costly mechanism for passing regulations than is passing
the bill in stand-alone form. The fact that regulatory lobbying picks up when there is Republican
unified government is yet another indication that groups seeking lower hurdles for regulation
may be lobbying during this opportune moment—when friends in office are passing must-pass
budgetary legislation—offering a good time for attaching riders to the budget bill. Note that
controversial groups, whose lobbying efforts legislators might want to hide from the voters, seem
to blend into other lobbying efforts, demonstrating no discernible statistical pattern in lobbying.
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V.

CONCLUSION
This paper complements the extensive micro-oriented (or single vote or single-issue)

literature on interest groups by examining the macro-determinants and timing of interest group
lobby. In doing so, it has argued that there are three types of policy windows that arise for
interest groups: endogenous windows, exogenous windows, and structural windows. The paper
argues that structural windows can have a significant effect on the timing of interest group
lobbying. Employing a new dataset of lobbying at the state level, the paper exploits cross-state
and time-series variation to determine how features of government affect lobbying expenditures.
The paper demonstrates that interest groups increase their activities substantially when the
legislature is in regular session and when the legislature is engaged in budgeting. It also
demonstrates that much of this budget year effect can be explained by business and trade groups
expanding lobbying efforts during budget years. Unions and government agencies do not
increase lobbying efforts during this time.
Moreover, businesses, which comprise on average 86% of all lobbying expenditures
within a given state, have much lower variance in lobbying than other groups. This is consistent
with the idea that businesses maintain a steady and continued presence in legislatures, while
other types of interest groups expand and contract their lobbying as their resources and the issues
that interest them, rise and decline in the legislature. Additionally, interest groups largely
unaffected by the budget numbers also lobby during budgetary time periods. One reason for this
is that they may be encouraging legislators to use the budget as a vehicle on which to attach nonbudgetary riders.
One final result from the paper is that elections have a negative or no (in the interaction
term) effect on timing of lobbying, contrary to some received wisdom. It is clear that the
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variation in institutional structure of state governments allows us to see structural policy
windows that might not otherwise be discernible. Moreover, the data presented here will allow
us to explore in more depth the determinants of interest group lobbying effort.
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Figure 1
Panel A: Federal Lobbying Expenditures
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Figure 2: Aggregate Lobbying Expenditures
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Table 1: Electoral and Institutional Determinants of Aggregate Lobbying Expenditures
Dependent Variable: Log of Total Per Capita Lobbying Expenditures for each state for each year

Variable

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Electoral Model

Legislative Model

Base Model

Model 4
Full Model with
Interactive Effects

Budget Year

0.215***
(0.067)

0.197**
(0.080)

0.231***
(0.081)

Regular Session

1.057***
(0.128)

1.063***
(0.128)

0.575**
(0.267)

Special Session

0.051
(0.046)

0.067
(0.047)

0.070
(0.046)

Election Year

-0.188***
(0.046)

-0.023
(0.048)

-0.581**
(0.273)

Size of House Majority

0.840
(0.688)

0.960*
(0.572)

0.984*
(0.568)

Size of Senate Majority

-1.289**
(0.620)

-1.427***
(0.518)

-1.407***
(0.515)

Unified Government

-0.009
(0.117)

-0.018
(0.097)

-0.020
(0.096)

Democratic Unified

-0.028
(0.143)

-0.039
(0.119)

-0.029
(0.118)

Ln(Per Capita Income)

2.019***
(0.505)

2.355***
(0.404)

1.997***
(0.419)

1.999***
(0.416)

Year

16.608***
(2.488)

16.354***
(2.071)

16.424***
(2.064)

16.507***
(2.052)

Year2

-0.004***
(0.001)

-0.004***
(0.001)

-0.004***
(0.001)

-0.004***
(0.001)

Regular Session * Election Year

0.595**
(0.287)

Constant

-16,641.48***
(2,475.84)

-16,392.22***
(2,061.20)

-16,460.94***
(2,054.56)

-16,543.26***
(2,042.67)

State Fixed Effects

FE

FE

FE

FE

R-squared
F-statistic
n

0.713
86.54
319

0.798
184.54
319

0.805
103.35
319

0.808
96.24
319

Two-sided t-tests with robust standard errors: *** 99% significance level; ** 95% significance level; *90% significance level
Note: Thirty-three states are included in the analysis, state fixed effects (FE) are used for all Models.

Table 2: Robustness of Determinants of Aggregate Lobbying Expenditures
Dependent Variable: Log of Total Per Capita Lobbying Expenditures for each state for each year

Variable

Model 5
Budget Amount

Budget Year

Model 6

Model 7
Structural
Full Model with RE Measures with RE

Model 8
Lobby Reporting
Rules

0.230***
(0.080)

0.229***
(0.081)

0.229***
(0.081)

Budget Amount

0.082*
(0.044)

Regular Session

0.811**
(0.391)

0.568**
(0.264)

0.565**
(0.266)

0.580**
(0.268)

Special Session

0.066
(0.060)

0.071
(0.046)

0.070
(0.046)

0.070
(0.047)

Budget Caps

-0.301
(0.735)

Term Limits

-0.029
(0.133)

Professional Staff

-0.092
(1.222)

Senate Size

-0.002
(0.041)

House Size

0.001
(0.010)

Veto Override

3.409
(6.583)

Admin Review Std

0.290
(0.798)

Election Year

-0.276
(0.393)

-0.586**
(0.270)

-0.588**
(0.272)

-0.576**
(0.274)

Size of House Majority

1.398*
(0.751)

0.949*
(0.560)

0.939*
(0.570)

0.961*
(0.572)

Size of Senate Majority

-1.475**
(0.656)

-1.378***
(0.508)

-1.379***
(0.512)

-1.410***
(0.519)

Unified Government

0.054
(0.121)

-0.044
(0.095)

-0.044
(0.095)

-0.023
(0.096)

Democratic Unified

-0.127
(0.155)

-0.001
(0.116)

-0.002
(0.117)

-0.029
(0.118)

Ln(Per Capita Income)

1.815***
(0.504)

2.073***
(0.405)

2.037***
(0.410)

1.924***
(0.449)

Year

15.184***
(3.422)

16.649***
(2.036)

16.554***
(2.075)

15.993***
(2.397)

2

-0.004***
(0.001)

-0.004***
(0.001)

-0.004***
(0.001)

-0.004***
(0.001)

Year

Regular Session * Election Year

0.252
(0.409)

0.599**
(0.284)

0.601**
(0.286)

0.588**
(0.288)

Definitional Refinement

0.012
(0.116)

Definitional Expansion

0.036
(0.095)

Constant

-15,042.65***
(3,402.43)

-16,648.32***
(2,026.30)

-16,592.71***
(2,064.77)

-16,030.81***
(2,387.84)

State Fixed/Random Effects

FE

RE

RE

FE

R-squared
F-statistic
n

0.809
64.04
224

.
.
319

.
.
319

0.808
81.98
319

Two-sided t-tests with robust standard errors: *** 99% significance level; ** 95% significance level; *90% significance level
Note: Thirty-three states are included in the analysis, state fixed effects (FE) or random effects (RE) are used for all Models, as
noted.

TABLE 3: Total Lobbying Expenditures By Interest Group Category

Firm

Trade

Union

Government

Membership

Idaho

$633,994
254.30%

$1,485,494
595.83%

$44,107
17.69%

$5,801
2.33%

$199,406
79.98%

Indiana

$22,010,043
465.92%

$16,029,121
339.31%

$1,191,370
25.22%

$2,101,832
44.49%

$1,430,810
30.29%

Kentucky

$15,278,490
567.46%

$14,228,288
528.45%

$939,042
34.88%

$721,506
26.80%

$1,031,886
38.33%

Maryland

$81,621,524
632.19%

$59,099,302
457.75%

$1,798,775
13.93%

$1,688,856
13.08%

$9,423,215
72.99%

Montana

$3,370,952
166.91%

$4,989,198
247.04%

$309,407
15.32%

$664,689
32.91%

$1,045,513
51.77%

Oregon

$41,586,521
179.31%

$55,454,477
239.11%

$4,954,661
21.36%

$10,083,137
43.48%

$8,154,618
35.16%

Virginia

$28,298,970
205.88%

$30,452,100
221.55%

$785,144
5.71%

$6,821,487
49.63%

$6,138,544
44.66%

Vermont

$10,361,286
255.62%

$9,758,959
240.76%

$360,064
8.88%

$44,806
1.11%

$3,648,474
90.01%

Wisconsin

$71,416,329
220.18%

$102,315,604
315.44%

$7,814,127
24.09%

$10,613,263
32.72%

$14,008,523
43.19%

Note: Data is for all available years for each state. Firms and trade associations comprise on average 86% of lobbying
expenditures in every state, and no less than 80% of lobbying expenditures in any state.

Table 4: Distribution of Total Lobbying Expenditures and Special Interest/PAC Expenditures at the
Federal and State Level
Federal

State

Lobbying

PAC

Lobbying

PAC/Special Interest

Corporations

55%

40%

40%

Trade Associations

29%

27%

46%

Labor

6%

9%

2%

16%

Issue/Ideology/Membership

2%

23%

7%

22%

Other

7%

0%

4%

0%

62%

Source: FEC (2001); Ansolabahere et al (2002); Author (2004), The Institute on Money in State Politics (2004)

Note: All federal lobbying data is for 1997-98 (average) lobbying expenditures. All federal PAC data is for 1996 and 1998 election
cycle PAC contributions. State lobbying data is for nine states as described in paper for all years available. All state special
interest/PAC data is for the same nine states in the paper for all years available. Totals may not add to 100% because of rounding.

Table 5: State Level Lobby Expenditure by Group Category
Dependent Variable: Log of Total Per Capita Lobbying Expenditures for each grouping for each state for each year

Variable

Model 9

Model 10

Model 11

Model 12

Model 13

Firms

Trade
Associations

Union

Government

Membership
Groups

Budget Year

0.356**
(0.133)

0.251**
(0.119)

0.325
(0.324)

0.409
(0.466)

0.612*
(0.333)

Regular Session

0.122
(0.225)

0.431*
(0.238)

1.588
(1.242)

0.300
(1.008)

0.088
(0.661)

Special Session

0.098
(0.150)

0.233
(0.160)

0.235
(0.212)

-0.062
(0.203)

0.057
(0.187)

Election Year

-0.446
(0.407)

-0.251
(0.423)

1.266
(1.101)

-0.636
(0.722)

-0.793
(0.579)

Size of House Majority

-0.655
(1.464)

-0.645
(1.428)

-1.732
(2.883)

0.471
(5.651)

-0.908
(2.790)

Size of Senate Majority

-1.256
(1.240)

-0.102
(1.356)

-0.505
(1.961)

1.571
(2.781)

-2.962
(2.667)

Unified Government

0.157
(0.217)

0.224
(0.196)

0.265
(0.258)

0.810***
(0.226)

0.234
(0.316)

Democratic Unified

-0.274
(0.242)

-0.387*
(0.225)

-0.051
(0.647)

-0.626
(0.657)

-0.405
(0.349)

Ln(Per Capita Income)

6.131
(4.874)

1.236
(4.570)

-2.377
(8.253)

-2.548
(8.643)

9.250
(8.398)

Year

16.282
(34.535)

-20.508
(34.841)

-119.605
(79.870)

-9.621
(95.724)

-25.853
(56.078)

Year2

-0.004
(0.009)

0.005
(0.009)

0.03
(0.020)

0.002
(0.024)

0.006
(0.014)

Session Year * Election Year

0.476
(0.424)

0.263
(0.441)

-1.161
(1.224)

0.747
(1.073)

1.005
(0.768)

Constant

-16,266.07
(34,502.95)

20,435.98
(34,819.60)

119,343.70
(79,732.60)

9,501.36
(95,595.75)

25,817.80
(56,019.44)

State Fixed Effects

FE

FE

FE

FE

FE

R-squared
n

0.932
53

0.905
53

0.876
53

0.938
53

0.883
53

Two-sided t-tests with robust standard errors: *** 99% significance level; ** 95% significance level; *90% significance level
Note: Nine states are included in the analysis; state fixed effects (FE) are used in all models.

TABLE 6: Classification of Issue Areas
Budgetary and Regulatory

Primarily Regulatory

Agriculture
Construction
Education
Environment
Health
Indians
Pharma*
Police and Fire
Transportation
Welfare

Banking
Civil Rights
Communications
Energy
Gambling*
Good Government
Guns
Hotel
Insurance
Law
Manufacturing
Real Estate*
Religion
Resources
Services
Small Business
Smokes*
Spirits*
Sports
Utilities
Women

* indicates also a "hidden" issue (see text for full explanation)

Table 7: State Level Lobby Expenditure by Issue Area
Dependent Variable: Log of Total Per Capita Lobbying Expenditures for each issue area for each state for each year

Variable

Model 14

Model 15

Model 16

Budget and Regulatory
Issues

Primarily Regulatory Issues

Hidden Groups

Budget Year

0.331**
(0.149)

0.409***
(0.110)

0.386
(0.265)

Regular Session

0.325
(0.391)

0.421
(0.258)

0.055
(0.521)

Special Session

0.145
(0.103)

0.154**
(0.069)

0.037
(0.135)

Election Year

-0.683*
(0.377)

-0.301
(0.224)

-0.086
(0.379)

Size of House Majority

-0.409
(1.218)

-0.714
(0.963)

-2.578
(2.350)

Size of Senate Majority

-1.483
(1.084)

0.104
(0.874)

-1.199
(1.568)

Unified Government

0.382***
(0.147)

0.265***
(0.089)

0.161
(0.196)

Democratic Unified

-0.398
(0.252)

-0.350**
(0.165)

-0.524
(0.337)

Ln(Per Capita Income)

6.637*
(3.767)

0.570
(2.714)

4.572
(6.182)

Year

-60.883**
(28.655)

-1.692
(21.012)

14.654
(44.034)

Year2

0.015**
(0.007)

0.001
(0.005)

-0.004
(0.011)

Session Year * Election Year

0.749*
(0.434)

0.383
(0.273)

0.173
(0.522)

Constant

60,789.12**
(28,622.71)

1,616.30
(20,981.02)

-14,700.10
(43,984.64)

State or Issue Fixed Effects

State and Issue FE

State and Issue FE

State and Issue FE

R-squared
n

0.74
528

0.80
1074

0.63
261

Two-sided t-tests with robust standard errors: *** 99% significance level; ** 95% significance level; *90% significance level
Note: Nine states are included in the analysis; state fixed effects (FE) and issue area fixed effects (FE) are used in all models.

APPENDIX: Variable Definitions and Sources
Ln(State Lobby Exp Per Capita)

Categories

Issue Areas

Budget Year

Equal to the Log of Annual Per Capita State Aggregate Lobbying Expenditures (Ethics Commission of Each
State where data is available; includes 33 states. Most data is obtain from official disclosures provided.)

Categorization of each interest group into each of five categories: corporate, trade association, membership
organization, union, and government; for each state for each year. (Ethics Commission of Each State where
data is available; includes 9 states. Most data is obtain from official disclosures provided. N > 35,000)

Categorization of each interest group into 24 issue areas as defined by Wolak et al (2004). We create eight
additional categories which more finely define the issues. For interest groups with missing data, we conduct a
web search to determine to which category the group belongs. (Ethics Commission of Each State where data is
available; includes 9 states. Most data is obtain from official disclosures provided. N > 35,000. Professor David
Lowery provided the categorization data from this website; used in Wolak et al (2004))
Equal to 1 if the state budget is legally mandated to be created in the year; 0 otherwise. (National Council of
State Legislatures (NCSL))

Budget Amount

Equal to Log of the Per Capita amount of budget in years that Budget Year = 1; Equal to 10% of budget in years
that Budget Year = 0. See Footnote 9 for a precise definition. (Statistical Abstract of the United States)

Regular Session

Equal to 1 if the legislature is in regular session that year; = 0 otherwise. (NCSL)

Special Session

Long (Short) Session

Equal to 1 if the legislature meets in special session in that year; = 0 otherwise (Book of the States and NCSL)
Equal to 1 if the legislature meets in long (short) session in that year; = 0 otherwise (Book of the States and
NCSL)

Election Year

Equal to 1 if the legislature holds regularly scheduled election in that year; = 0 otherwise (NCSL)

Budget Caps

Equal to 1 if the state has budget caps; = 0 otherwise (Professor David Primo, data used in Primo, 2003)

Term Limits

Equal to 1 if the state has legislative term limits; = 0 otherwise (Professor Jeff Milyo, data used in Primo and
Milyo 2004)

Professional Staff
Senate (House) Size

Equal to 1 if the legislators in the state have full time professional committee staff; = 0 otherwise (Book of the
States)
The number of seats in the state senate (house) (ICPSR and updated by Book of the States)

Veto Override

The percentage of legislators that must vote for an override of the governor's veto in a given state (Book of the
States)

Admin Review Std

Equal to 1 if the a statute must be passed to override a regulatory agency in a state; = 0 otherwise (Book of the
States)

Unified Government

Equal to 1 if the House, Senate and Governorship is held by the same party in a state; = 0 otherwise (Book of
the States)

Democratic Unified

Equal to 1 when the Unified Government variable = 1 AND the it is a Democratic Party unification; = 0 otherwise
(Book of the States)

Ln(Per Capita Income)
Ln(Population)
Year

Expansion

Refinement

Log of Per Capita Personal Income of the State in a given year (Bureau of Economic Analysis, Department of
Commerce (BEA))
Log of Population of the State (Census and BEA)
Year

Equal to 1 if the lobbying disclosure law in the state in a given year includes gifts to legislators, non-campaign
contributions to legislators, or broad definitions of legislative influence; = 0 otherwise (Book of the States)
Equal to 1 if the lobbying disclosure law in the state in a give year includes disclosure of source of funds, source
of compensation, or categorization of lobbying activities; = 0 otherwise (Book of the States)

